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1970/05/12



Received in CBS 5/9/70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

5/12

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TO : S - The Secretary

6834

THROUGH: S/S *W*

FROM : EA - Marshall Green *W/G Mr*

SUBJECT: Guidance for the May 20 Sino-U.S.
Ambassadorial Meeting - ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

I attach the guidance prepared for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the May 20 Sino-U.S. ambassadorial meeting to be held in Warsaw (Tab B), along with a covering memorandum to the President for your signature (Tab A).

The memorandum to the President considers the alternatives open to us on the questions of Southeast Asia and further discussion of a higher-level meeting. We have recommended that:

a) we do not raise the issue of Southeast Asia and continue to keep the talks focused on bilateral Sino-U.S. issues. Should the Chinese raise Southeast Asia in their statement, Ambassador Stoessel will be provided with contingency guidance which we will prepare as we draw nearer the May 20 date.

b) we do not proceed with our original plans to discuss the question of a higher-level meeting in our opening statement since developments over the past three months have made the Chinese position on this issue far less certain. We suggest, therefore, that the Ambassador refer to our earlier discussions of

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this subject and ask the Chinese to confirm that they continue to feel that such a higher-level meeting would be useful. If they so confirm, we would then proceed with our previously prepared position during our rebuttal statement.

The only other addition to the guidance previously approved by the White House is a recommendation that Ambassador Stoessel refer to the Chinese satellite informally after the meeting and note the consistent U.S. position favoring the peaceful exploration of outer space.

Finally, we strongly recommend that, should the meeting indicate we will continue moving toward a higher-level meeting, we should brief the Governments of Japan and the Republic of China at the highest levels as soon as possible after May 20.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Clearances:

EA/ACA - Mr. Kreisberg <i>AK</i>	EA/ROC - Mr. Shoesmith <i>AK</i>
EA - Ambassador Brown <i>AK</i>	EA - Mr. Sullivan <i>AK</i>
- Mr. Moore <i>AK</i>	
L/EA - Mr. Aldrich <i>AK</i>	
EUR - Mr. Swank <i>AK</i>	

Attachments:

Tab A - Memorandum to the President.

Tab B - Guidance for May 20 Sino-U.S. Meeting.

EA/ACA:DMAnderson *AK*

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

F163 S/S Pending

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May 12, 1970

Replaced by contents of
telegram LDX'd to White
House (no. 826, May 17,
1970). RLBrown 5/18/70

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Guidance for the May 20
Ambassadorial Meeting

DO NOT RELEAS () () C, OADR

NOTES REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: *Jeon*
Date: *6/30* 1978

I. INTRODUCTION:

Enclosed for your approval is suggested guidance for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the May 20 Sino-U.S. ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw. The guidance remains basically unchanged from that which you approved on April 6. Two important questions have arisen, however, on which your decision is requested. These are whether and how we should deal with the situation in Southeast Asia, and whether and at what pace we should press for a higher-level meeting in Peking.

II. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

Southeast Asia - Aside from referring to your letter of April 7 to Chou En-lai about Laos, I believe we should not initiate discussion of Southeast Asia and that we should continue to try to confine the talks to bilateral issues. We will, however, prepare contingency guidance for use should the Chinese attack our actions in Southeast Asia. This will be dealt with in a separate telegram for which I will seek your approval shortly before the May 20 meeting.

Higher-Level Meeting - I believe we should note our previous discussion of this question and request confirmation from the Chinese that they remain interested in moving forward on a higher-level meeting. If they reiterate their interest, Ambassador Stoessel would follow the guidance you approved in April, discussing the principles which we feel should form a basis for such a meeting and certain modalities such as diplomatic immunities, timing, etc., which would have to be agreed upon prior to the meeting. If they do not, we should express regret and drop the matter.

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EA/ACA: PM Anderson, PH Kreisberg, Jit

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The enclosed guidance has been prepared based on the courses of action recommended above.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Southeast Asia - Alternative Basic Approaches

1. Discuss Southeast Asia as Part of a General Effort to Relax Tension - We could remind the Chinese of their statement on February 20 that they were prepared to discuss the relaxation of tension in the Far East, asking what further steps they were prepared to take in this direction. We could discuss our objectives in Southeast Asia, their limits and our hope that a peaceful settlement could be reached. We would urge Chinese cooperation in reaching a negotiated settlement but would not directly link developments in Southeast Asia with further progress at the Warsaw talks.

2. Separate Southeast Asia and the Warsaw Talks (Recommended) - We could avoid raising the question of Southeast Asia and, except for asking for an early and favorable response to your April 7 letter to Chou En-lai, would continue to focus on bilateral issues. If the Chinese raise the issue, we would then respond.

Discussion of Alternative Courses of Action - Raising the question of Southeast Asia would emphasize the seriousness with which we view developments in Indo-China. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Chinese would be prepared to respond with anything other than their publicly stated positions.

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We have intelligence indicating that Peking plans to restrict its own statements at the forthcoming meeting to bilateral issues and to bypass the question of Southeast Asia. Some additional weight is given this view by the fact that Peking simultaneously announced the holding of the Indo-Chinese Peoples Conference and our forthcoming Warsaw talks on April 27.

Nevertheless, the Chinese undoubtedly will come to the meeting prepared to respond to any U.S. statements on the subject. Our raising the subject of Southeast Asia at this time, therefore, would result in a polemical Chinese response and would probably return the talks to the totally sterile pattern they followed until this year. In any event, we continue to be able to communicate with the Chinese, either by letter or through informal exchanges at Warsaw on the subject of Indo-China.

B. Higher-Level Meeting - Basic Alternative Approaches

1. Proceed as Originally Planned - We could proceed as we had originally planned in the April guidance, indicating our willingness to discuss arrangements for a higher-level meeting in Peking.

2. Delay Detailed Discussion of the Subject Until the Chinese Have Spoken (Recommended) - Ambassador Stoessel could limit his opening remarks to a request for confirmation that Peking continues to feel that a higher-level meeting would be useful. Depending on the Chinese response, we would then either proceed to set forth our willingness to discuss this question or drop the matter while expressing our regret.

3. Pull Back from Our Earlier Indication of Interest - In view of developments in Southeast Asia, we might avoid discussing a higher-level meeting or indicate that, at least for the present, we are no longer interested.

Discussion of Alternative Courses of Action - Ambassador Stoessel speaks first at this meeting. Even if we wish to continue to discuss a higher-level meeting,

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the fact that Ambassador Stoessel will speak without knowledge of the current Chinese attitude, the lapse of three months and the rapidly developing situation in Southeast Asia suggest caution in proceeding as we originally had planned.

By pulling back completely from our earlier, more positive attitude toward a higher-level meeting, we would signal a diminished U.S. expectation from discussions with Peking and would probably foreclose, at least for the foreseeable future, any movement toward such a meeting.

By asking for confirmation that the Chinese remain interested in progress on a higher-level meeting before stating our own position, we would avoid the risk of a total Chinese rebuff and retain tactical flexibility in deciding at the time whether to move ahead on the higher-level meeting issue, if the Chinese indicate that their interest continues, or to drop the matter for the time being if they do not.

The importance of an improvement in Sino-U.S. relations which led six weeks ago to the decision to proceed with discussion of a higher-level meeting remains unchanged. Furthermore, PRC agreement to proceed with a higher-level meeting would offset concern abroad and domestically that our actions in Indo-China may have adversely affected the possibility of easing Sino-U.S. tension. Thus far, we have no evidence that the Chinese have changed their attitude toward the forthcoming meeting in Warsaw.

Our recent actions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam may offset concern which movement toward a higher-level meeting otherwise might cause in South Korea, the Republic of China, South Viet-Nam and Thailand. Nonetheless, the possibility of such a meeting in Peking will come as a disappointment to the GRC, which probably will feel compelled to register its strong opposition. Other governments in East Asia probably will regard the announcement of a higher-level meeting as reassuring evidence of our continued desire to seek a peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation.

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
IV. OTHER ISSUES:

A. Chinese Satellite

I have recommended that Ambassador Stoessel raise the matter of the launching of the Chinese satellite informally following the conclusion of the meeting. He would express his appreciation of the Chinese technological achievement, and indicate that the United States has consistently favored the peaceful exploration of outer space.

B. Briefing in Japan and the Republic of China

The Governments of Japan and the Republic of China are intensely interested in what may happen at these meetings. The GRC's interest is obvious, and the GOJ is very anxious to keep in step with us on China policy. They have already begun to feel that we are not being altogether candid with them. Even with every precaution there is always the risk of some leak, perhaps even a deliberate one from Peking. I feel that, particularly if the May 20 meeting indicates that we will continue moving towards a higher-level meeting, we should brief these governments at the highest level very candidly as soon as possible after the meeting.


William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Guidance for May 20
Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting

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